Collective bargaining under non-binding contracts by Dobbelaere, S. & Luttens, R.I.
TI 2011-041/3 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
 
Collective Bargaining under Non-
binding Contracts 
  
Sabien Dobbelaere1 
Roland Iwan Luttens2 
 
1 VU University Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, and IZA; 
2 SHERPPA, Ghent University, and CORE, Cath. University Louvain. 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, 
with the ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in 
core areas of finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
Collective bargaining under non-binding contracts
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Abstract
We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the rm and its risk-neutral employees
negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the
non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding
risk-neutral e¢ cient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and
prots coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure
that follows from unionization.
JEL classication : C71, J51, L20.
Keywords : Collective bargaining, union, rm, bargaining power, non-binding contract.
1 Introduction
Equilibrium wage-employment contracts that result from worker-rm negotiations are determined
by three distinct characteristics of the bargaining framework:
(1) Labor organization: bargaining can take place (i) collectively between workers organized in a
union and the rm or (ii) at the individual level between each worker and the rm.
(2) Bargaining scope: bargaining issues involve (i) only wages, in which case the rm retains the
right to determine employment unilaterally or (ii) wages and working conditions (e.g. employ-
ment, worker e¤ort, capital-to-labor ratio).
(3) (In)completeness of the contract: the workers and the rm agree upon (i) a binding contract
that commits either party to future wage and employment decisions or (ii) a non-binding
contract where either party can call for renegotiations before production starts.
We are grateful to Bart Cockx, Pieter Gautier, Harold Houba, Philipp Kircher, Glenn Rayp and seminar/conference partic-
ipants at VU University Amsterdam, the second UECE Lisbon meetings (Lisbon, 2010) and the rst annual Christmas meeting
of Belgian economists (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2010) for helpful comments. This research is conducted while the second author is
visiting VU University Amsterdam which hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
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As a benchmark, consider a neoclassical (NC) (non-bargaining) rm that writes binding con-
tracts with its workers at the reservation wage. The properties of two binding equilibrium wage-
employment contracts are widely known in the collective bargaining literature. The right-to-manage
bargaining (RTM) model postulates that the union bargains with the rm over wages (Nickell and
Andrews, 1983). Compared to the NC rm, underemployment emerges. The union and the rm
agree on a Pareto-ine¢ cient contract. To obtain Pareto e¢ ciency, the e¢ cient bargaining (EB)
model requires that the union and the rm negotiate simultaneously over wages and employment
(McDonald and Solow, 1981). Under the assumption of a risk-neutral union, the underemployment
result of the RTM model disappears. Stole and Zwiebel (SZ) (1996a, 1996b) formalize intrarm
wage bargaining between the rm and its individual risk-neutral employees who are irreplaceable
and cannot be contractually tied to the rm. In equilibrium, the SZ rm overhires relative to the
NC rm to such an extent that bargained wages are driven down to the reservation wage. Extending
the SZ analysis, de Fontenay and Gans (FG) (2003) introduce an outside pool of ready-to-employ
replacement workers. Such a nite pool makes it no longer optimal for the rm to overemploy. More-
over, insiders still capture a wage rent since losing an employee brings the rm closer to running
out of replacement workers. Therefore, the FG rm underhires relative to the NC rm.
Whereas SZ and FG study individual wage bargaining, many real world labor markets are char-
acterized by union wage bargaining. Capturing this institutional feature, our paper contributes to
the collective bargaining literature by investigating how unionization a¤ects equilibrium wages and
prots in a non-binding contract setting. Following the binding collective bargaining literature, we
assume that the conventional generalized Nash bargaining solution is the appropriate solution con-
cept and that the union and the rm are risk neutral. A common assumption in binding collective
bargaining models is that all employed union members return to the external labor market when
negotiations fail. However, in the presence of non-binding contracts, it is not sensible to prevent
workers from making individual employment decisions, even within a unionized rm. Therefore, the
unique feature of our model is that, consistent with the SZ bargaining environment, a dissatised
worker is free to quit and/or the rm is free to dismiss an individual worker. Hence, we allow the
union to renegotiate with the rm in a nite sequence of bargaining sessions with each time one
employee less in the rm. As such, our analysis enables to verify whether the SZ overemployment
and the FG underemployment results are robust to a change in the labor organization.
Our pronounced result is that equilibrium wages, prots and employment of our non-binding col-
lective wage bargaining setting are equivalent to the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of the
binding EB setting. The important corollary is that due to unionization, the SZ overemployment
result disappears. We also show that the availability and the size of a nite replacement pool
leaves the wage-employment equilibrium unchanged. These ndings allow to conclude that due to
unionization, the FG underemployment result disappears. Finally, to provide a game-theoretical
characterization of our equilibrium wages and prots, we demonstrate that our non-cooperative
equilibrium wages and prots coincide with the Owen values of the cooperative game with the
coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
The striking lesson that can be learned from our equivalence result is that starting from the RTM
framework, a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome can be obtained by changing the type of contract from binding
to non-binding instead of changing the bargaining scope from wages to wages and employment. This
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alternative route of reaching Pareto e¢ ciency is absent in standard labor economics textbooks that
advocate changing the framework from RTM to EB.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the equilibrium non-
binding wage-employment contract under risk-neutrality in a collective bargaining setting, shows
the equivalence between our outcome and the outcome of binding risk-neutral e¢ cient bargaining
and investigates the role of a replacement pool on the equilibrium wage-employment contract. The
cooperative game-theoretical characterization of our equilibrium wages and prots is provided in
Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Collective bargaining under non-binding contracts
2.1 Model
In this section, we describe our model heuristically; in Appendix we provide a non-cooperative
bargaining game in extensive form that analytically underpins our model. Essential for our analysis
is the assumption that labor contracts are non-binding with no capability to bind either party to
future wage and employment decisions. Hence, the union and the rm can engage in an arbitrary
number of pairwise negotiations prior to production in which the union can costlessly re-open
negotiations over the individual wages of its employed members with the rm and vice versa. Such
a renegotiation occurs when a dissatised worker decides to quit and/or the rm decides to dismiss
an individual worker. We allow the union to renegotiate with the rm on behalf of all remaining
employees when any employee leaves the rm. An employee who returns to the external labor market
can never re-enter the rm and stays a union member earning the reservation wage. In Section 2.2,
we assume that employees are irreplaceable. We relax the irreplaceability assumption in Section
2.3. We assume risk-neutral employees with individual utilities equal to wages. Union preferences
are represented by a utilitarian objective function. We assume generalized Nash bargaining. The
bargaining scope is negotiation over wages alone.
We present a discrete version of the model, but results easily extend when labor is assumed to be
continuous. Consider a xed-size union of N 2 N members. A subset of n union members (the
employees) work in the rm. We assume that the union is su¢ ciently large to cover labor demand
(n  N ). We endogenize the choice of n later on. Wages are generically denoted by w. The
reservation wage is w. We denote ~w(n) the employees wage in our non-binding setting when there
are n employees. The rm utilizes a single asset, increasing and diminishing returns production
function F (n) : N! R+. We assume that F (i)  iw for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng for reasons of incentive
compatibility that will become clear later on. Denote F (n)  F (n) F (n  1) the rst di¤erence
operator. The prot function is generically denoted by (n) : N! R. The neoclassical rms prot
function equals NC(n)  F (n)  nw. The rms prot function in this non-binding setting equals
~(n)  F (n)  n ~w(n). We denote the bargaining power of the union by  2 [0; 1].
2.2 Equivalence with e¢ cient bargaining
We are looking for the bargaining outcome (or contract) that is (i) e¢ cient, i.e. i ~w(i)+ ~(i) = F (i)
for all i  n, (ii) stable, i.e. for any given bargaining power, neither the union nor the rm can
respectively improve wages or prots in a pairwise renegotiation and (iii) incentive compatible with
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respect to w, i.e. ~w(i)  w for all i  n implying that the employeesoutside option constraint is
not violated.
Our main result is stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Under risk neutrality, the outcome of the non-binding collective wage bargaining
framework coincides with the outcome of the binding e¢ cient bargaining framework.
Proof. Under utilitarian union preferences, the unions payo¤ when there are n employees equals
n ~w(n) + (N   n)w. The unions payo¤ when there are n   1 employees equals (n   1) ~w(n  
1) + (N   n + 1)w. Hence, the unions net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals
n ~w(n)   (n   1) ~w(n   1)   w. The rms net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals
~(n)  ~(n  1). The outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to
max
~w
[n ~w(n)  (n  1) ~w(n  1)  w][~(n)  ~(n  1)]1  (1)
We derive the equilibrium contract inductively over the number of employees. Consider the case
where only one employee is present. Let F (0) = 0. From the rst-order condition of the logarithm
of Eq. (1), we obtain
~(1) = 1  ( ~w(1)  w)
, F (1)  ~w(1) = 1  ( ~w(1)  w)
, ~w(1) = F (1) + (1  )w
Note that ~w(1) is incentive compatible by assumption. Now consider the case where two employees
are present. We obtain
~(2)  ~(1) = 1  (2 ~w(2)  ~w(1)  w)
, F (2)  2 ~w(2) + ~w(1) = 1  (2 ~w(2)  ~w(1)  w)
, ~w(2) = 2F (2) + 12 ~w(1) + (1 )2 w
, ~w(2) = 2 [F (2) + F (1)] + (1  )w
Note that ~w(2) is incentive compatible by assumption. Generalizing the above argument over any
n by induction, we obtain as the solution to the rst-order di¤erence equation above the following
expressions for ~w(n) and ~(n):
~w(n) =

n
nX
i=1
F (i) + (1  )w (2)
and
~(n) = (1  )
"
nX
i=1
F (i)  nw
#
(3)
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Eqs. (2) and (3) easily rewrite when directly using the production function rather than the marginal
products:
~w(n) =

n
F (n) + (1  )w (4)
and
~(n) = (1  ) [F (n)  nw] = (1  )NC(n) (5)
Note that ~w(n) is incentive compatible by assumption.1 From Eq. (5), it follows that the optimal
employment level in our setting, denoted by ~n, coincides with the optimal employment level of the
neoclassical rm, denoted by nNC .
Under EB, the outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to
max
w;n
[n(w   w)][(n)]1  (6)
Maximization of Eq. (6) with respect to the wage and employment gives the following two rst-order
conditions respectively:
wEB(n) = (1  )w + F (n)
n
(7)
wEB(n) = F (n) + 

F (n) F (n)n
n

(8)
Solving Eqs. (7) and (8) simultaneously gives the expression for the contract curve: F (n) =
w. Hence, the optimal level of employment under risk-neutral e¢ cient bargaining, denoted nEB,
coincides with nNC and, as we just showed, with ~n
. From Eqs. (4) and (7), it follows that
~w(~n) = wEB(nEB). As a result, ~(~n
) = EB(nEB). 
We provide an intuitive interpretation for Proposition 1. The driving force behind the result is that
when a rm bargains with a union in a non-binding contract setting over wages alone, the rm cannot
determine employment afterwards unilaterally anymore. This is due to the stability requirement
of the contract. Suppose that the union and the rm agree upon a wage ~w(~n). However, assume
that max
n
~(n) = n0 > ~n. The rm chooses employment level n0, after which the union and the
rm want to renegotiate ~w(n0), contradicting that ~w(~n) was stable. In other words, although at
the outset the union and the rm bargain only over wages in a non-binding contract setting, they
implicitly have to reach a binding agreement on wages and employment in the end. The latter is
exactly the objective of union-rm bargaining in an EB framework.
Proposition 1 allows to investigate whether the SZ overemployment result is robust to a change in
the labor organization. The answer is negative since the optimal level of employment in our setting
coincides with the one of an NC rm. Hence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Due to unionization, the SZ overemployment result disappears in a non-binding con-
tract setting.
1 If ~w(n)  w, it cannot happen that ~w(i) < w for some i < n when the rm optimally chooses its input level and the
underlying neoclassical prot function is quasi-concave. Furthermore, our analysis shows that it is never optimal for the rm
to hire workers beyond the point where ~w(n) = w. Nevertheless, beyond this employment level, wages in our bargaining game
would be given by w and not by ~w(n) < w.
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2.3 The role of a replacement pool
In the previous section, we assume that employees are irreplaceable. Alternatively, the union could
deploy its union members outside the rm to provide the rm with a nite, ready-to-employ re-
placement pool. More specically, we again assume that an employee who leaves the rm can never
return to the rm and stays a union member earning the reservation wage. However, the rm
can now immediately draw upon the replacement pool to substitute the latter. The question in
terms of application is whether rms have such a replacement pool available. The answer is most
likely a¢ rmative when untrained or low-skilled employees are involved. It is well documented that
for such employees, negotiations with the rm typically occur collectively rather than individually,
making our setting most relevant.
We obtain Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In a non-binding collective wage bargaining framework, the availability and the size
of a nite replacement pool leaves the wage-employment equilibrium unchanged.
Proof. It is su¢ cient to show that the equilibrium wage in a non-binding collective bargaining
setting is not a¤ected by the availability and the size of a replacement pool. Denote the employees
wage by ~wN n (n) where the subscript indicates the number of unionized ready-to-employ workers
outside the rm and the number in parentheses indicates the number of employees. Similarly, the
rms prot equals ~N n (n). The unions payo¤ in case the rm does not draw upon the replace-
ment pool equals n ~wN n (n) + (N   n)w. The unions payo¤ in case the rm replaces an employee
equals n ~wN n 1 (n) + (N   n)w. Hence, the unions net gain from reaching a bargaining agree-
ment equals n ( ~wN n (n)  ~wN n 1 (n)). The rms net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement
equals ~N n (n)  ~N n 1 (n). The outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to
max
~w
[n ( ~wN n (n)  ~wN n 1 (n))][~N n (n)  ~N n 1 (n)]1  (9)
From the rst-order condition of the logarithm of Eq. (9), we obtain
~N n (n)  ~N n 1 (n) = 1  n ( ~wN n (n)  ~wN n 1 (n))
, n ( ~wN n 1 (n)  ~wN n (n)) = 1  n ( ~wN n (n)  ~wN n 1 (n))
, ~wN n (n) = ~wN n 1 (n)
From induction over the number of unionized ready-to-employ workers, we obtain that ~wN n (n) =
~wN n 1 (n) = : : : = ~w1 (n) = ~w0 (n). It is easy to check that the result holds for any number of
employees, i.e. ~wN i (i) = ~w0 (i) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. 
We give an intuitive interpretation for Proposition 2. Suppose that for a given employment level
n, the union and the rm agree upon a wage scheme that negatively depends on the size of the
replacement pool. Consider n employees and N   n unionized ready-to-employ workers. In this
case, the rm wants to keep the replacement pool as large as possible in order to reduce the wage
bill. However, the union has an incentive to deploy the replacement pool in order to increase the
total sum of union memberswages. As a result, the wage scheme cannot be stable. A similar
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argument, where the incentives of the rm and the union are reversed, holds when the wage scheme
depends positively on the replacement pool.
Propositions 1 & 2 allow to answer the question whether the FG underemployment result is robust
to a change in the labor organization. The answer is negative since the presence of a replacement
pool does not a¤ect the wage-employment equilibrium and the latter coincides with the binding EB
equilibrium. Hence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Due to unionization, the FG underemployment result disappears in a non-binding
contract setting with a nite replacement pool.
We end Section 2 by commenting on the e¤ect of abstaining from the risk-neutrality assumption.
Importantly, since the equivalence between our contract and the e¢ cient bargaining contract is
driven by the stability requirement, this equivalence would still hold if workers were risk-averse
(risk-loving). In other words, risk-neutrality is not needed to obtain Proposition 1. However, as
the Pareto-e¢ cient contract lies on a negatively (positively) sloped contract curve, the optimal
employment level no longer coincides with neoclassical employment, leading to underemployment
(overemployment). As a result, without imposing risk neutrality, Corollaries 1 & 2 would no longer
hold.
3 A cooperative game-theoretical characterization
This section provides di¤erent cooperative game-theoretical characterizations of our non-cooperative
equilibrium wages and prots.
Consider the (n+ 1)-player cooperative game (N; v), where N = f0; 1; : : : ; ng is the set of play-
ers in which we index the rm as 0 and the employees as the positive integers 1 to n. The
mapping v : 2jN j ! R represents the characteristic function, assigning to any possible coalition
S  N a real number v (S) called the value of coalition S. The value of the empty coalition equals
zero, i.e. v (;) = 0. Any coalition S excluding the rm does not have access to the rms pro-
duction process and obtains its outside option, i.e. v (S) = jSjw when 0 =2 S. Any coalition S
including the rm engages in production, i.e. v (S) = F (jSj   1) when 0 2 S. The value of the
grand coalition equals v (N) = F (jN j   1) = F (n). Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) demonstrate that
if the rms bargaining power equals 1=2
 
i.e. 1   = 12

, SZ wages and SZ prots respectively
coincide with the Shapley values of the workers and the rm for this (n+ 1)-player cooperative
game, i.e. wSZ(n) = Sh1 (N; v) = : : : = Shn (N; v) and SZ(n) = Sh0 (N; v) respectively, where
Shi (N; v) =
P
SNnfig
jSj!(jN j jSj 1)!
jN j! (v (S [ fig)  v(S)) for all i 2 N .
3.1 The 2-player cooperative game
Before establishing a cooperative game-theoretical characterization of our collective bargaining non-
binding wage-employment contract in the (n+ 1)-player cooperative game, we rst consider the 2-
player cooperative game (f0; 1g ; v), denoting the rm as 0 and the union consisting of n employees
as 1. For this 2-player game, it holds that v (;) = v (0) = 0, v (1) = nw and v (0; 1) = F (n).
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We obtain Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. If the rms bargaining power equals 1=2 , then workerswages equal the Shapley
value of the union divided by the number of employees and the rms prot equals its Shapley value.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that ~(n) = 12 (F (n)  nw) and n ~w(n) =
1
2 (F (n) + nw) are not the respective Shapley values of the rm and the union in the cooperative
game (f0; 1g ; v). Then, following Myerson (1980), at least one of the following two conditions must
be violated: (i) Balanced contributions: Sh0 (f0; 1g ; v) Sh0 (f0g ; v) = Sh1 (f0; 1g ; v) Sh1 (f1g ; v)
or (ii) E¢ ciency: Sh0 (f0; 1g ; v) + Sh1 (f0; 1g ; v) = v (0; 1). It is straightforward that condition
(ii) is satised. Since Sh0 (f0g ; v) = 0 and Sh1 (f1g ; v) = nw, it follows that condition (i) is also
satised, thereby contradicting that ~(n) and n ~w(n) are not the Shapley values of the rm and the
union in the cooperative game (f0; 1g ; v). 
Proposition 3 can be generalized for any bargaining power  2 [0; 1]. Dene a unanimity game uS
as a game such that uS(T ) = 1 if S  T and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. It is well known that every
coalitional game (N; v) can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in a unique way,
i.e. v =
P
SN S(v)uS . The coe¢ cients S(v) are called unanimity coe¢ cients of the game (N; v)
and are given by S(v) =
P
TS( 1)jSj jT jv(T ). The weighted Shapley value for any coalitional
game (N; v) and weight vector (i)i2N is then given by Shi(N; v; ) =
P
i2S S(v)
iP
j2S j
. We
obtain Proposition 4.
Proposition 4.Workerswages equal the weighted Shapley value of the union divided by the number
of employees and the rms prot equals its weighted Shapley value for any weight vector  = (0; 1)
where 00+1 = 1   and 10+1 = .
Proof. In our setting, f0g(v) = 0, f1g(v) = nw and f0;1g(v) = F (n)   nw. When  = (0; 1)
where 00+1 = 1  and 10+1 = , the reader can check that Sh0(N; v; ) = (1 ) (F (n)  nw) =
~(n) and Sh1(N; v; ) = nw +  (F (n)  nw) = F (n) + (1  )nw = n ~w(n). 
3.2 The (n+ 1)-player cooperative game
The previous section allows for a characterization of equilibrium wages and prots in terms of
(weighted) Shapley values. Returning to the (n+ 1)-player cooperative game (N; v), we obtain an
alternative characterization in terms of modied Shapley values, known as Owen values (Owen,
1977), that takes into account possible coalitional structures that may form between players. The
standard textbook interpretation of the Shapley value is that of a queue of players, where each player
is entering a room and is obtaining her marginal contribution to the coalition of players already
present in the room. In case of the Shapley value, all queues are formed with equal probability
and the Shapley value is precisely the expected marginal contribution to coalitions with respect to
this random order of players. In contrast, the Owen value restricts the possible formation of queues
according to the coalitional structure. We formally dene a coalitional structure B = fS1; : : : ; Smg
which partitions N into m disjoint subsets. Let ! be a permutation on N and let 
 be the set of
all permutations on N . Dene 
(B) as the subset of 
, which includes only the orders in which
players of the same component of B appear successively; i.e. 
(B) = f! 2 
 : if i; j 2 Sk and
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!(i) < !(l) < !(j), then l 2 Skg. Then, the Owen value assigns to each player her expected
marginal contribution to the coalition of preceding players with respect to a uniform distribution
over the set of orders in 
(B); i.e. Oi(B; v) = 1j
(B)j
P
!2
(B)
(v(P!i [ i)  v(P!i )) for all i 2 N , where
P!i = fj 2 N;!(j) < !(i)g.
In our framework, B = fS1; S2g where S1 = f0g is containing the rm, and S2 = f1; : : : ; ng is
containing the workers.
We obtain Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. If the rms bargaining power equals 1=2 , then workerswages and the rms prot
equal their Owen values in the cooperative game with coalitional structure B.
Proof. First, consider the rm. Note that, given the coalitional structure B, the rm enters either
rst or last in the order of players, implying that

( B) = 2n!. The marginal contribution of the
rm entering rst equals 0, the marginal contribution of the rm entering last equals F (n)   nw.
Hence, O0
 
B; v

= n!2n! (F (n)  nw) = 12 (F (n)  nw) = ~(n). The result for the workerswages
follows by noting that (i) the cooperative game among workers when the rm is absent is inessential,
implying that Oi
 
B; v

= Oj
 
B; v

for all i; j 2 S2 and that (ii) Owen values satisfy e¢ ciency with
respect to the grand coalition, implying that
P
i2N Oi
 
B; v

= v(N). Hence, we obtain, for all
i 2 S2, Oi( B; v) = v(N) O0( B;v)n =
F (n)  1
2
(F (n) nw)
n =
1
2nF (n)  12w = ~w(n). 
Proposition 5 can be generalized for any bargaining power  2 [0; 1] in terms of weightedOwen
values in the cooperative game with coalitional structure B. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the latter solution concept is not yet dened in the literature (for any coalitional structure B) and
doing so goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, for our specic coalitional structure B,
an elegant interpretation can be given which resembles Owen (1968)s original interpretation of the
weights of the weighted Shapley value as a measure of playersdelay to reach the grand coalition.
Owen showed that the introduction of weights amounts to distorting the equal probabilities with
which queues form in the following way: the higher the weight of a player, the higher the probability
of the queues in which this player arrives the last. In our setting with coalitional structure B
and the rms bargaining power equal to 1=2, the rm ends up at either end of the order with
equal probability, yielding the Owen value of 1=2 times the rms marginal contribution to the
grand coalition (remember that the marginal contribution of the rm entering rst equals zero).
Generalizing, with coalitional structure B and the rms bargaining power equal to (1  ), the
rms bargaining power exactly reects the probability that the rm enters the last in the order of
players, yielding the weightedOwen value of (1  ) times the rms marginal contribution to
the grand coalition.
4 Conclusion
To represent a widespread, institutional characteristic of contemporary labor markets, this paper
introduces collective bargaining in a non-binding contract setting where the rm and its risk-neutral
employees bargain over wages alone. We show that the wage-employment equilibrium coincides with
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the outcome of the binding e¢ cient bargaining framework. The driving force behind this result is
that, due to the stability requirement in a non-binding contract setting, the rm is not able to
determine employment unilaterally even if bargaining is over wages alone. The availability and the
size of a nite replacement pool leaves the wage-employment equilibrium unchanged. These ndings
allow to conclude that due to unionization, the Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) overemployment
result and the de Fontenay and Gans (2003) underemployment result disappear. Furthermore, the
rm and the workers receive their expected marginal contribution of the corresponding cooperative
game with the coalitional structure that follows from all workers being represented by a single union.
Within our static collective non-binding bargaining framework, an evident continuation is to explore
applications regarding hiring decisions, technological choice and organizational design. Furthermore,
if data on labor contract specicities were available, our equivalence result would provide the foun-
dation of an original test of Pareto e¢ ciency in the empirical collective bargaining literature. An
interesting extension of our framework, following Horn and Wolinsky (1988), is to introduce worker
heterogeneity and to study the formation of multi-union patterns, possibly exploited by the rm to
its advantage.
Recently, within a dynamic framework, a number of studies have introduced individual wage bar-
gaining in a search and matching economy (e.g. Cahuc and Wasmer, 2001; Cahuc et al.; 2008;
Helpman et al., 2008; Mortensen, 2009). Bauer and Lingens (2010) are the rst to analyze and
compare the wage-employment equilibrium under collective and individual wage bargaining in a
large rm search model in an attempt to answer the question whether collective wage bargaining
can restore e¢ ciency in the labor market or not. Under the assumption that collective wage bar-
gaining takes the form of all employees delegating the wage negotiation to a representative worker
and deciding jointly whether to work or not, they show that both collective and individual wage
bargaining regimes deliver ine¢ cient allocations. Whether these conclusions also hold when allow-
ing employees in a unionized rm to make individual employment decisions still remains an open
question.
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Appendix : A non-cooperative representation
In this Appendix we present an extensive-form bargaining game whose unique subgame perfect
equilibrium corresponds with the equilibrium wage-employment contract described in the main
text. Consider a rm with n unionized employees. Bargaining proceeds as a nite sequence of
pairwise bargaining sessions over wages between the union and the rm.
In Figure A.1, each bargaining session is depicted by a box, representing the number of employees
on which behalf the union is negotiating with the rm. In the rst bargaining session, the union
represents n employees. In each bargaining session, either the union and the rm reach an agreement
(A), or negotiations break down (B). Whenever an agreement is reached, the game ends. Whenever
a bargaining session ends in a breakdown, one randomly chosen employee exits the game forever,
after which bargaining starts again between the rm and the union representing the remaining
employees. At most n bargaining sessions can occur before the game terminates in which case all
employees have dropped out following failed bargaining sessions.
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Figure A.1: Game representation in extensive-form.
Within each bargaining session, the union and the rm play the alternating-o¤er bargaining game
of Binmore et al. (1986) in which there is an exogenous probability of breakdown following each
rejected o¤er. Breakdown probabilities di¤er following a rejection by the rm or the union. The
game is described as follows. Starting with the rm, the rm and the union alternate wage proposals.
If a proposal is accepted, negotiations terminate. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down
with probability pf if a rejection is made by the rm and with probability pu if a rejection is made
by the union. When a breakdown does not occur, the rejecting party makes a counterproposal.
Proposals are made until one is accepted or a breakdown occurs. There is no discounting. It is
straightforward to demonstrate that every bargaining power  2 [0; 1] is consistent for some pair of
probabilities (pf ; pu) in the following way:
 =
pf (1  pu)
pf (1  pu) + pu
We look for the limiting outcome as breakdown probabilities approach zero. Binmore et al. (1986)
show that for such a bargaining session the generalized Nash bargaining solution emerges.
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